Malicious IcedID Loader Execution via Rundll32 from Excel Macro (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-31
Updated
2026-10-31

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Excel spawning rundll32 to load a .dat file through the DllRegisterServer export, the execution chain used by IcedID campaigns delivered through Excel 4.0 macros. A spreadsheet launching a renamed DLL export marks weaponized document execution leading to banking trojan installation.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.