Malicious Kernel Driver Load from User AppData Directory

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
- T1014Rootkit
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of known malicious kernel driver file names from a user AppData directory which is an abnormal location for signed drivers. NCC Group attributed netfilter and related drivers to a rootkit that manipulates network traffic and hides malicious activity. Loading a driver from a writable user path indicates rootkit installation and kernel level defense evasion.

Reporting behind it

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Malicious Kernel Driver Load from User AppData Directory

Pivot detection · T1543.003 · 9 related

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