Malicious Kernel Module Loaded From a User-Writable Path on Linux (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-27
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects insmod loading a kernel module (.ko) from a temporary or user-writable directory, an indicator of a loadable-kernel-module rootkit being installed rather than a package-managed driver. Kernel module abuse is a stealthy Linux persistence and defense-evasion technique referenced in the Red Canary Threat Detection Report. Because legitimate drivers load from system paths, module loads from user paths are a strong indicator of malicious activity.

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Pivot detection · T1547.006 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.