Malicious Known Vulnerable Driver Load for BYOVD Attack

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1068Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of known vulnerable kernel drivers such as viragt64.sys dbutil_2_3.sys zamguard64.sys RtCore64.sys gdrv.sys and empntdrv.sys which adversaries abuse in bring your own vulnerable driver attacks to disable security tooling and gain kernel level execution. Presence of these driver filenames loading on an endpoint is a strong indicator of privilege escalation or defense evasion activity.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1068 — drag to rearrange

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Windows Malicious Driver Load Identified by Known Bad Driver File Names

Windows Driver Load of Known Vulnerable Drivers by File Name

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Malicious Known Vulnerable Driver Load for BYOVD Attack

Pivot detection · T1068 · 9 related

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