Malicious Lunar Spider Loader Execution via rundll32 (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-30
Updated
2026-10-30

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe loading the malicious upfilles.dll with the stow export. This behavior was observed in a Lunar Spider intrusion where a signed LOLBin was abused to run a malicious loader DLL. Detecting it exposes early execution and defense evasion before follow-on persistence and domain compromise.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.