Malicious Lynx Ransomware Encryptor Execution via Distinctive CLI Flags (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-26
Updated
2026-09-26

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects the Lynx ransomware encryptor launched with its distinctive command-line flags such as --encrypt-network, --load-drives, --stop-processes and --safe-mode documented by Group-IB. Adversaries pass these flags to terminate processes, mount hidden drives and encrypt network paths during deployment, so the combination is a high-confidence sign of active Lynx encryption.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.