Malicious macOS Credential Verification via dscl authonly

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
macos
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-06
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of dscl with the authonly flag to validate a captured password against the local directory service, a technique used by the AMOS stealer to confirm harvested credentials after phishing the user. Legitimate interactive use of dscl authonly is rare. This behavior indicates active credential access and verification on the host.

Related detections9 linkedT1555.001 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Sapphire Sleet TCC Privacy Database Tampering via sqlite3 (via process_creation)
Suspicious storagekitd Spawning Third-Party Filesystem Binary from Library Filesystems (via process_creation)
Malicious Switch User to Rogue Root-Equivalent Account troot (via process_creation)
Suspicious Sang Loader Execution with Install or PassUAC Arguments
Suspicious macOS Keychain Credential Dumping via security find-generic-password
Suspicious Credential Archive Staging in tmp via process_creation
Suspicious macOS Login Keychain Access via Command Line
Malicious macOS Keychain Credential Theft via security find-generic-password (via process_creation)
Suspicious Non-Wallet Process Accessing Cryptocurrency Wallet Files
Malicious macOS Credential Verification via dscl authonly
Pivot detection · T1555.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.