Malicious Marbled Dust Backdoor Executing from Public Videos Directory

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-14
Updated
2026-10-14

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of OMServerService.exe from the c\users\public\videos path. Microsoft attributed this GoLang backdoor to Marbled Dust in the Output Messenger espionage campaign. A service executable running from a world-writable public media folder is a clear misplacement of a legitimate-looking name, marking it as the deployed backdoor.

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Malicious Marbled Dust Backdoor Executing from Public Videos Directory
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.