Malicious Marimo Notebook Credential File Access via Shell (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-29
Updated
2026-10-29

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Execution

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a Marimo notebook process spawning a shell that reads environment and deployment credential files on Linux hosts. Attackers exploiting the Marimo terminal remote code execution vulnerability harvested env docker-compose and celerybeat schedule files to steal secrets. A notebook engine reading these credential bearing files indicates post exploitation credential theft.

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Malicious Marimo Notebook Credential File Access via Shell (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1190 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.