Malicious Masquerading via IEXPLORE.EXE OriginalFileName on Unexpected Image (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-26
Updated
2026-09-26

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects a process carrying the OriginalFileName IEXPLORE.EXE while running from an image other than the legitimate Internet Explorer binary, a masquerading pattern surfaced in Group-IB Hunting Rituals analysis of Autodrive.exe. Adversaries copy the Internet Explorer version resource onto renamed or relocated binaries to blend in, so a mismatch between the original filename and the actual image path indicates masquerading.

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Malicious Masquerading via IEXPLORE.EXE OriginalFileName on Unexpected Image (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1036.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.