Malicious Mini Shai-Hulud npm Dropper node setup.mjs from IDE Hook Dirs (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-05
Updated
2026-11-05

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Persistence

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects node executing setup.mjs from a .claude or .vscode directory which the Mini Shai-Hulud SAP npm compromise wires into Claude Code SessionStart and VS Code folderOpen hooks to run its Bun downloader on every session. Execution of this dropper from an IDE hook directory indicates the trojanized package payload is fetching and running execution.js.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.