Malicious Mini Shai-Hulud SAP npm Telemetry Exfiltration C2 (via dns_query)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
dns_query
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-04
Updated
2026-11-04

ATT&CK techniques

Exfiltration
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects DNS lookups for zero.masscan.cloud used by the Mini Shai-Hulud SAP npm supply-chain payload as its telemetry and exfiltration endpoint alongside a hardcoded collector IP. A resolution indicates the obfuscated execution.js payload has run and is exfiltrating GitHub npm and cloud credentials.

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Malicious Mini Shai-Hulud SAP npm Telemetry Exfiltration C2 (via dns_query)
Pivot detection · T1567 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.