Malicious NetSupport RAT Execution From Public Folder via Process Creation

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-19
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the NetSupport client32.exe running with its client32.ini configuration from the Users Public directory, a placement pattern characteristic of NetSupport Manager abused as a remote access trojan. Attackers deploy the legitimate remote control tool from world-writable locations to gain hands-on-keyboard access while blending in with sanctioned software, so this path is a strong indicator of RAT abuse.

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SplashTop Network
Malicious NetSupport RAT Execution From Public Folder via Process Creation
Pivot detection · T1219 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.