Malicious NotDoor Outlook VBA Persistence via VbaProject.OTM Deployment (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-11
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Priv Esc

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects command lines that copy a staging file into the Outlook VbaProject.OTM macro container used by the NotDoor backdoor for persistence. Overwriting VbaProject.OTM lets attacker VBA code execute on Outlook startup and mail events.

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Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.