Malicious NTDS.dit Access via Shadow Copy GLOBALROOT Path

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-08
Updated
2026-10-08

ATT&CK techniques

Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects access to ntds.dit through a GLOBALROOT volume shadow copy device path. The CloudComputating group copied the Active Directory database directly from a shadow copy to steal domain credentials while bypassing file locks on the live NTDS.dit.

Related detections9 linkedT1003.003 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Shadow Copy Creation via WMIC (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS Extraction via Ntdsutil IFM
Malicious NTDS.dit Credential Extraction via ntdsutil
Malicious NTDS Credential Theft via Wbadmin Backup
Malicious NTDS.DIT Extraction via Ntdsutil IFM
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Access via Mklink to GLOBALROOT
Malicious NTDS Extraction via Ntdsutil IFM Snapshot
Malicious NTDS.dit Extraction via ntdsutil IFM
Malicious NTDS Database Dump via Ntdsutil IFM (via process_creation)
Malicious NTDS.dit Access via Shadow Copy GLOBALROOT Path
Pivot detection · T1003.003 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.