Malicious OilRig OAuth Application Sign-In via Azure (via azure)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
azure
Service
signinlogs
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-23
Updated
2026-09-23

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects Azure AD sign-ins from the OAuth application client ID 860b23a7-d484-481d-9fea-d3e6e129e249 hardcoded in OilRig's cloud-service-powered downloaders. The group abuses this registered application to obtain tokens for Microsoft Graph and EWS based command-and-control, so any sign-in with this AppId indicates C2 activity.

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Malicious OilRig OAuth Application Sign-In via Azure (via azure)
Pivot detection · T1071.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.