Malicious Phantom DLL Hijacking of oci.dll Loaded by msdtc

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-06
Updated
2026-10-06

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects msdtc.exe loading oci.dll, a well-known phantom DLL hijacking technique used by the PassiveNeuron campaign to run an implant under a trusted system service. The oci.dll is not present by default so msdtc will load an attacker-supplied version placed in its search path. This grants stealthy code execution under a signed Windows service process for persistence and evasion.

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Malicious Phantom DLL Hijacking of oci.dll Loaded by msdtc
Pivot detection · T1574.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.