Malicious PowerShell Spawned by File Explorer via FileFix Social Engineering (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1059.001PowerShell
- T1204User Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects explorer.exe launching PowerShell, which occurs when a user pastes a disguised command into the File Explorer address bar under the FileFix social engineering technique. Attackers trick victims into executing this command to download and run an Interlock RAT or infostealer payload.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1059.001 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious PowerShell Harvesting RDP Logon Events via Get-WinEvent

Suspicious PowerShell Web Request to oastify Out-of-Band Domain

Suspicious PowerShell Execution of Untitled1 Script From ProgramData

Malicious PowerShell Spawned by File Explorer via FileFix Social Engineering (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1059.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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