Malicious PsExec Service Binary Execution from Windows Directory via services.exe (via process_creation)

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Lateral Movement

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1569.002Service Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
- T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin Shares
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects services.exe spawning a randomly named eight-character executable located directly in the Windows or System32 directory. This behaviour is characteristic of PsExec-style remote service execution used by adversaries for lateral movement, where the tooling drops and launches a service binary under a random name to blend in with legitimate service activity.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1021.002 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Remote Command Execution via smbexec Output Redirection Pattern

Malicious Lateral Movement via PsExec File-List Target

Malicious PsExec Service Installation via PSEXESVC

Suspicious Lateral Movement via PsExec Service (via process_creation)

Possible PsExec Remote Service Installation with Randomly Named Service (via security)

Windows Named Pipe Creation: Default RemCom Pipe Name

Windows Named Pipe Created for CSExec Default Pipe Name

Windows Registry Service Install Indicators for Cobalt Strike Staging

Windows Service Control Manager Events: Suspicious Service Install Paths used by Cobalt Strike

Malicious PsExec Service Binary Execution from Windows Directory via services.exe (via process_creation)

Pivot detection · T1021.002 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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