Malicious RDP Reconnaissance with Valid Credentials Performed on Multiple Hosts (via security)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Service
security
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-30
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Initial Access → Lateral Movement
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Collection

  9. C2

  10. Exfiltration

  11. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects brutforce RDP services with compromised credentials via tools like Hydra. Note that this event will be reported only with valid user and password credentials, and it may be reported only when RDP session is fully opened (so not during reconnaisance phase) if NLA is disabled. For further correlation, ID 4624/4625 (logon type 3, 7 or 10) should be used.

Related detections9 linkedT1078 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Login Shell Assigned to Service Account games on Linux
Suspicious SSH Daemon Configuration Change Enabling Root Login
Suspicious NTLM Network Logon From Attacker Controlled Workstation Names (via security)
Suspicious dMSA Object Access with Migration AccessMask
Suspicious RDP Connection File Opened From Download or Mail Directory via Process Creation
Malicious ESX Admins Group Added to Privileged Directory Group
Suspicious Firewall Rule Allowing SSH via New-NetFirewallRule During Ransomware
Malicious ESX Admins Group Creation via WinRM Host
Malicious RDP Tunneling via ngrok (via process_creation)
Malicious RDP Reconnaissance with Valid Credentials Performed on Multiple Hosts (via security)
Pivot detection · T1078 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.