Malicious Recovery Disablement via Bcdedit RecoveryEnabled No

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-16
Updated
2026-10-16

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects bcdedit.exe disabling Windows automatic recovery by setting recoveryenabled to no, an inhibit-system-recovery action performed by SafePay and many ransomware families before encryption. Disabling boot recovery has almost no legitimate administrative use on production hosts and indicates preparation for impact.

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Malicious Akira Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell WMI (via process_creation)
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI PowerShell
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI PowerShell (via ps_script)
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion for Recovery Inhibition
Malicious Boot Configuration Tampering via bcdedit [Intel471] #2
Malicious Recovery Disablement via Bcdedit RecoveryEnabled No
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.