Malicious Recovery Inhibition via Shadow Copy and WinRE Tampering

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects command lines that delete Volume Shadow Copies with vssadmin or disable the Windows Recovery Environment with reagentc, actions used by NOVABLIGHT to prevent system and file recovery. Inhibiting recovery is a common precursor to destructive or extortion activity.

Related detections9 linkedT1490 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Symbolic Link Evaluation Enabled via fsutil by RansomHub Ransomware
Suspicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell WMI by Akira Ransomware
VSS Backup Deletion or Resize (via process_creation)
Malicious Boot Recovery Tampering via Bcdedit (via process_creation)
Malicious Inhibition of System Recovery via Shadow Copy or Backup Deletion (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Native Backup Deletion (via process_creation)
DragonForce Ransomware Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC ShadowCopy Where Delete (via process_creation)
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin
Malicious ESXi Virtual Machine Termination and Snapshot Removal
Malicious Recovery Inhibition via Shadow Copy and WinRE Tampering
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.