Malicious Recovery Inhibition via Shadow Copy and WinRE Tampering

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-04
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects command lines that delete Volume Shadow Copies with vssadmin or disable the Windows Recovery Environment with reagentc, actions used by NOVABLIGHT to prevent system and file recovery. Inhibiting recovery is a common precursor to destructive or extortion activity.

Related detections9 linkedT1490 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious Anti-Recovery Zeroing via fsutil setZeroData (via process_creation)
Malicious Shadow Copy Removal via WMI PowerShell
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin
Malicious Inhibit System Recovery via Shadow Copy and Boot Config Tampering (via process_creation)
Malicious Recovery Disablement via Bcdedit RecoveryEnabled No
Suspicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin or wmic
Malicious System Recovery Inhibition via bcdedit and wbadmin before Ransomware (via process_creation)
Suspicious ESXi execInstalledOnly Disabled via esxcli During Ransomware
Malicious Recovery Inhibition via Shadow Copy and WinRE Tampering
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.