Malicious regsvr32 DLL Execution with Custom Install Argument

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-15
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects regsvr32 executed silently with the /n and /i install switches to register and pass a custom argument to a DLL, a technique observed in the AppleSeed triple-combo campaign that ran tripservice.dll with the marker /i:tgvyh. It captures signed-binary proxy execution used to run attacker DLL code while bypassing application controls. Detecting this is important because the combination of /s /n /i on regsvr32 rarely appears in legitimate software.

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Suspicious Run Key Persistence Executing regsvr32
Suspicious regsvr32 Registering DLL from User AppData
Malicious Regsvr32 Loading Masqueraded VPN DLL via Process Creation
Malicious Regsvr32 ShellExec_RunDLL Proxy Execution (via process_creation)
Suspicious DLL Execution via Regsvr32 DllInstall of dat File
Malicious Xctdoor XcLoader Execution via Regsvr32 AppX Path Abuse (via process_creation)
Malicious regsvr32 DLL Execution with Custom Install Argument
Pivot detection · T1218.010 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.