Malicious Removal of Defender Safe Mode Service Registration via Process Creation

ATT&CK techniques

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
Priv Esc
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects reg.exe deleting the SafeBoot registration for WinDefend, which the Embargo ransomware performs so that Microsoft Defender does not start after it reboots the host into safe mode. Removing a security service from the SafeBoot key is a deliberate tampering action. This indicates impairment of defenses ahead of encryption.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1685 — drag to rearrange

Malicious Microsoft Defender Real Time Protection Failure - Native (via windefend)

Malicious Defender for Endpoint eBPF Sensor Deactivation (via linux)

Suspicious Microsoft Defender Exclusion Added via PowerShell Add-MpPreference (via process_creation)

Suspicious NodeLoader Disabling Malicious Software Removal Tool Updates (via registry_set)

Suspicious NodeLoader Defender Exclusion for ProgramData via PowerShell (via process_creation)

Suspicious SELinux Enforcement Disabled via setenforce on Ivanti Appliance

Malicious ETW Disabling via COMPlus_ETWEnabled Environment Variable

Suspicious CrazyHunter BYOVD Driver Drop in Public Directory

Suspicious Execution of cfmon.exe Masquerading as ctfmon via CharmingCypress

Malicious Removal of Defender Safe Mode Service Registration via Process Creation

Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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