Malicious Renamed Rundll32 Copied to Temp via Xcopy

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-29
Updated
2026-10-29

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects xcopy copying the legitimate rundll32.exe binary into a user temp directory under a renamed filename as seen in the HTML smuggling IcedID intrusion that led to domain wide ransomware where the actor proxied execution of a malicious DLL through a renamed system binary and this matters because a renamed signed loader staged in temp is a strong indicator of defense evasion and hands on keyboard staging.

Related detections9 linkedT1218.011 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious Scheduled Task Executing Rundll32 DLL Export by Ordinal
Suspicious rundll32 Executing DLL from ProgramData (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rundll32 Loading DLL From Public or ProgramData Path via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Malicious LSASS Credential Dump via Rundll32 Comsvcs MiniDump via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rundll32 Execution Without a DLL Reference via Process Creation (via process_creation)
Suspicious WebDAV Retrieval via rundll32 and davclnt.dll (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rundll32 Execution with Latrodectus Loader Exports (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rundll32 Execution with IcedID Loader Export (via process_creation)
Malicious Scheduled Task Running rundll32 w32analytics (via process_creation)
Malicious Renamed Rundll32 Copied to Temp via Xcopy
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.