Malicious Restricted Admin Mode Enabled for Pass-the-Hash RDP

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
registry_set
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-01
Updated
2026-10-01

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Cred Access
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the DisableRestrictedAdmin registry value being set to 0 to enable Restricted Admin mode, a modification Huntress observed enabling pass-the-hash authentication over RDP. Attackers turn on this mode so a stolen NTLM hash can be used for interactive remote logon without a plaintext password. Enabling Restricted Admin outside of sanctioned hardening is a strong lateral-movement precursor.

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Suspicious RDP Enablement via fDenyTSConnections Registry Modification
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Suspicious RDP Enablement via fDenyTSConnections Registry Modification [Huntress] #2
Malicious LSASS Memory Dump via Rundll32 and Comsvcs MiniDump
Malicious Restricted Admin Mode Enabled for Pass-the-Hash RDP
Pivot detection · T1112 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.