Malicious Reverse SSH Tunnel via Plink for RDP Forwarding

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-09
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of the Plink SSH client to establish a reverse tunnel that forwards local RDP back to attacker infrastructure which Conti operators use for persistent remote access. Observed in NCC Group research on Conti operations after the leaks using a renamed Plink binary over port 53. Reverse RDP tunneling through SSH is a strong indicator of hands-on-keyboard intrusion.

Related detections9 linkedT1572 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious DNS Query to Dynamic DNS and Tunneling Providers Abused by RATs
Suspicious SSH Reverse Tunnel Over DNS Port
Suspicious Reverse SSH Tunnel Exposing Local SSH via process_creation
Suspicious OpenSSH Reverse Tunnel Creation via Process Creation
Suspicious OpenSSH Reverse Tunnel Establishment via process_creation
Suspicious LocalToNet Tunneling Tool Execution
Malicious RDP Tunneling via ngrok (via process_creation)
Suspicious UUID Named Pipe Created Consistent with Mythic SMB Agent
Malicious Chisel Reverse Tunnel Execution for Protocol Tunneling
Malicious Reverse SSH Tunnel via Plink for RDP Forwarding
Pivot detection · T1572 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.