Malicious RoKRAT Staged Loader Files in Temp via LNK (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-25
Updated
2026-09-25

ATT&CK techniques

Execution
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects the creation of the sequentially named toy01.dat, toy02.dat and toy03.bat loader files inside the user Temp directory as staged by the APT37 ToyBox Story campaign. These files form the multi-stage loader chain that ultimately decrypts and executes the RoKRAT payload on disk. Alerting on these campaign-specific staged artifacts catches the delivery step where the loaders are written before execution.

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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.