Malicious rundll32 Execution of BoomBox NativeCache DLL (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-04
Updated
2026-10-04

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32.exe loading a DLL from the AppData Microsoft NativeCache path with the _configNativeCache export, the BoomBox downloader execution chain. BoomBox uses this proxied DLL execution to run in memory under a trusted binary and stage follow-on payloads used by Nobelium.

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Malicious rundll32 Execution of BoomBox NativeCache DLL (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.