Malicious Rundll32 notepad2 DLL Proxy Execution

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-24
Updated
2026-09-24

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects rundll32 loading notepad2.dll and invoking its notepad export, the proxy-execution technique used by the spyware in the Pakistan dating-app campaign. Naming the malicious DLL and export after Notepad disguises code execution as a benign editor, so this specific invocation reveals the loader.

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Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.