Malicious Security Product Bypass via defendnot Loader

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-07-05
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of the defendnot loader, a tool analyzed by Huntress that registers a fake antivirus through the Windows Security Center API to silently disable Microsoft Defender. The loader drops a ctx.bin configuration and injects defendnot.dll into taskmgr.exe to persist the fake AV registration. Because defendnot exists solely to neutralize Defender, its execution is a high-confidence defense-evasion indicator.

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Malicious BYOVD EDR Kill via Renamed GMER Driver by Agonizing Serpens
Malicious Security Product Bypass via defendnot Loader
Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.