Malicious Service DLL Hijack for Persistence via Lotus Blossom

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
Persistence
- T1112Modify Registry
- T1543.003Windows Service
Priv Esc
- T1543.003Windows Service
Defense Evasion
- T1112Modify Registry
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects modification of the ServiceDll parameter of the legitimate TapiSrv swprv or AppMgmt services which the Lotus Blossom espionage group abuses to load its Sagerunex backdoor under a trusted service host process. Rewriting the ServiceDll of these built in services is a stealthy persistence and defense evasion technique.

Reporting behind it

Related detections9 linkedT1112 — drag to rearrange

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Suspicious Windows Service Trigger Configuration via Registry Modification

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Windows Registry Persistence via UMe/UT Run Keys

Windows Security: Detect Scheduled Task Creation for OilRig-Related Persistence

Windows Scheduled Task Process Creating autoit3.exe for nslookup TXT Queries (OilRig)

Malicious Enabling of Restricted Admin Mode via Registry by UAT-8837

Suspicious Enabling of Remote Desktop via fDenyTSConnections Registry by DeadLock Ransomware

Malicious Service DLL Hijack for Persistence via Lotus Blossom

Pivot detection · T1112 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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