Malicious Shadow Copy and Backup Deletion via vssadmin wmic and wbadmin (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-26
Updated
2026-09-26

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects deletion of Volume Shadow Copies and system backups through vssadmin delete shadows, wmic shadowcopy delete and wbadmin delete commands used by the Hunters International ransomware group per Group-IB. Adversaries remove these recovery points to prevent restoration before encrypting data, so this activity is a strong indicator of imminent ransomware impact.

Related detections9 linkedT1490 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin
Malicious Inhibit System Recovery via Native Backup and Shadow Copy Deletion (via process_creation)
Malicious Inhibit System Recovery via bcdedit Boot Policy Change by Chaos Ransomware (via process_creation)
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion and Recovery Inhibition via process_creation
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion and Boot Recovery Tampering via Process Creation
Malicious Boot Configuration Set to Safe Mode with Networking via bcdedit
Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin to Inhibit Recovery
Suspicious Symlink Evaluation Enabled via fsutil
Malicious Shadow Copy and Backup Deletion via vssadmin wmic and wbadmin (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.