Malicious Shadow Copy Removal via WMI PowerShell

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-20
Updated
2026-10-20

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell enumerating and removing volume shadow copies through the Win32_Shadowcopy WMI class. This behavior matches Akira ransomware which deletes shadow copies via WMI to prevent recovery before encrypting files. Programmatic shadow copy removal is a strong impact indicator that precedes ransomware detonation.

Related detections9 linkedT1490 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin
Malicious Inhibit System Recovery via Shadow Copy and Boot Config Tampering (via process_creation)
Malicious Recovery Disablement via Bcdedit RecoveryEnabled No
Suspicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin or wmic
Malicious System Recovery Inhibition via bcdedit and wbadmin before Ransomware (via process_creation)
Suspicious ESXi execInstalledOnly Disabled via esxcli During Ransomware
Malicious Akira Shadow Copy Deletion via PowerShell WMI (via process_creation)
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI PowerShell
Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI PowerShell (via ps_script)
Malicious Shadow Copy Removal via WMI PowerShell
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.