Malicious SonicWall SMA wsproxy Request Tunneling Internal SSH

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
webserver
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-11-02
Updated
2026-11-02

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects abuse of the SonicWall SMA wsproxy endpoint to tunnel SSH traffic to internal hosts. During the SonicWall SMA 0-day exploitation the actor issued wsproxy requests specifying serviceType SSH with an arbitrary host and port to pivot into the internal network over the appliance. Proxying arbitrary internal services through the VPN gateway enables lateral movement and hands the attacker deep network access.

Related detections9 linkedT1090 — drag to rearrange
Suspicious SOCKS Proxy Binary Execution from Temp via GlobalProtect Compromise
Suspicious Python SOCKS Proxy Script Execution from Temp via Ivanti Compromise
Malicious QDoor Remote Proxy Execution via WMIC Node Process Call Create of svhost from Temp (via process_creation)
Suspicious SOCKS Proxy Persistence via SystemBC PowerShell Run Key
Malicious Java Backdoor Execution from Public Documents via javaw (via process_creation)
Suspicious Proxyware Installation via accept-tos Flag on Linux
Suspicious DNS Query to Dynamic DNS and Tunneling Providers Abused by RATs
Malicious GenAI Browser Extension C2 and PAC Redirection (via proxy)
Malicious FRP Reverse Proxy Tunnel Identified by Hardcoded Token (via process_creation)
Malicious SonicWall SMA wsproxy Request Tunneling Internal SSH
Pivot detection · T1090 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.