Malicious svcagent DLL Load From AssetMon ProgramData Directory via PHANTOMPULSE

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
image_load
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-05-15
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Priv Esc → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of svcagent.dll from a ProgramData AssetMon directory as used by the PHANTOMPULSE blockchain C2 RAT in Elastic research. A service agent named DLL staged under a fabricated AssetMon folder in ProgramData indicates the implant module being mapped for execution and persistence.

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Malicious svcagent DLL Load From AssetMon ProgramData Directory via PHANTOMPULSE
Pivot detection · T1055 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.