Malicious System Recovery Inhibition via bcdedit and wbadmin before Ransomware (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-14
Updated
2026-10-14

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects recovery-inhibition commands that disable Windows automatic recovery via bcdedit or delete the backup catalog via wbadmin, the pre-encryption destruction step in the CLFS zero-day intrusion that led to ransomware. Adversaries remove recovery options to maximize damage and pressure victims, so these commands appearing together with staging activity are a critical pre-ransomware indicator.

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Malicious System Recovery Inhibition via bcdedit and wbadmin before Ransomware (via process_creation)
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Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.