Malicious Tunneling Tool Execution on Linux Host (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · Medium · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-07
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

C2
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of known network tunneling and proxy utilities used to pivot and exfiltrate from compromised Linux and container hosts. Observed in the Elastic Security Labs TeamPCP scenario where gost, frps, chisel, and socat establish covert channels for command and control and lateral movement.

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Windows Process Creation: cloudflared Tunnel Execution with Config and Credentials Flags
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Malicious Tunneling Tool Execution on Linux Host (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1090 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.