Malicious Tusk Persistence via FJ_load Scheduled Task

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Priv Esc

Recon
Resource Dev
Initial Access
Execution
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
Persistence
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
Priv Esc
- T1053.005Scheduled Task
Defense Evasion
Cred Access
Discovery
Lateral Movement
Collection
C2
Exfiltration
Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of a scheduled task named FJ_load that runs madHcCtrl.exe at user logon, the persistence mechanism of the Tusk infostealer campaign. The task keeps the loader resident across reboots, so detecting its creation catches the campaign at the persistence stage.

Reporting behind it

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Malicious Tusk Persistence via FJ_load Scheduled Task

Pivot detection · T1053.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.

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