Malicious Unsigned VIB Installation on ESXi Host via esxcli (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-28
Updated
2026-10-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

  13. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects installation of a VMware Installation Bundle on an ESXi host with signature verification bypassed through a forced or no signature check flag. Fire Ant deployed malicious unsigned VIB packages with a lowered acceptance level to gain persistence beneath the hypervisor. Forcing unsigned package installation is rarely part of legitimate ESXi maintenance.

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Pivot detection · T1685 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.