Malicious USN Change Journal Deletion via Fsutil for Anti-Forensics

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-16
Updated
2026-10-16

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of fsutil to delete the NTFS USN change journal which NotPetya performed to destroy filesystem forensic evidence as documented by NCC Group. Deletion of the change journal removes records of file activity and is rarely part of legitimate administration.

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Malicious USN Change Journal Deletion via Fsutil for Anti-Forensics
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.