Malicious Velvet Ant Linux Backdoor and Credential Harvesting Artifacts (via file_event)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
file_event
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-28
Updated
2026-10-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Collection
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Discovery

  7. Lateral Movement

  8. C2

  9. Exfiltration

  10. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects creation of file artifacts tied to the Velvet Ant Operation Highland intrusion, including a renamed GS-Netcat backdoor and hidden logs written by backdoored SSH and PAM components to store harvested credentials and keystrokes. These specific paths are not part of a standard Linux installation.

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Suspicious sqlcipher Decryption of Signal Database by WAVESIGN (via process_creation)
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Malicious Velvet Ant Linux Backdoor and Credential Harvesting Artifacts (via file_event)
Pivot detection · T1005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.