Malicious VoidLink Kernel Module Load via Insmod (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
linux
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-06-30
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Defense Evasion

  6. Cred Access

  7. Discovery

  8. Lateral Movement

  9. Collection

  10. C2

  11. Exfiltration

  12. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects loading of the VoidLink rootkit kernel modules via insmod or modprobe under masquerading and rootkit names. Observed in Elastic Security Labs analysis where vl_stealth.ko or a fake amd_mem_encrypt.ko module installs ftrace syscall hooks and eBPF-based hiding to conceal the framework.

Related detections9 linkedT1014 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Kernel Driver Service Registration for ProjectConfiguration Rootkit
Malicious Vulnerable Driver Mapping via KDU
Suspicious Fileless Execution From Memory File Descriptor via PUMAKIT
Malicious VoidLink Kernel Module Load via Insmod (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1014 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.