Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion for Recovery Inhibition

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-05
Updated
2026-10-05

ATT&CK techniques

Execution → Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Persistence

  5. Priv Esc

  6. Defense Evasion

  7. Cred Access

  8. Discovery

  9. Lateral Movement

  10. Collection

  11. C2

  12. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects deletion of volume shadow copies through vssadmin, wmic or PowerShell, the recovery-inhibition step used by the Handala group and many destructive operations before encryption or wiping. Removing shadow copies prevents victims from restoring affected files. Administrative shadow copy deletion on endpoints is uncommon and warrants review alongside other impact indicators.

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Pivot detection · T1047 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.