Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-11
Updated
2026-09-11

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects vssadmin deleting volume shadow copies, an inhibit-recovery action performed in Talos IR ransomware engagements immediately before encryption. Removing shadow copies prevents victims from restoring files and is a near-universal precursor to ransomware detonation.

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Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via wmic and vssadmin (via process_creation)
Malicious System Recovery Inhibition via bcdedit and vssadmin in Mallox
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Suspicious Anti-Recovery Zeroing via fsutil setZeroData (via process_creation)
Malicious Shadow Copy Removal via WMI PowerShell
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin
Malicious Inhibit System Recovery via Shadow Copy and Boot Config Tampering (via process_creation)
Malicious Recovery Disablement via Bcdedit RecoveryEnabled No
Suspicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin or wmic
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via vssadmin
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.