Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-28
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects vssadmin deleting all volume shadow copies which the actors in the Sliver and PoshC2 toolkit intrusion ran to inhibit recovery ahead of impact and this matters because deleting every shadow copy removes the primary local restore path and is a defining pre encryption ransomware action rarely performed by legitimate administrators.

Related detections9 linkedT1490 — drag to rearrange
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Malicious Inhibition of System Recovery via Shadow Copy or Backup Deletion (via process_creation)
Malicious Windows Native Backup Deletion (via process_creation)
DragonForce Ransomware Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC ShadowCopy Where Delete (via process_creation)
Malicious ESXi Virtual Machine Termination and Snapshot Removal
Malicious Shadow Copy and Backup Deletion for Ransomware Recovery Inhibition
Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via Vssadmin
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.