Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI PowerShell

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
ps_script
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-10-01
Updated
2026-10-01

ATT&CK techniques

Impact
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

What it detects

This rule detects PowerShell that enumerates Win32_Shadowcopy objects and pipes them to Remove-WmiObject to destroy volume shadow copies, an inhibit-recovery step preceding encryption. This behavior was observed in RMM-enabled intrusions leading to Akira ransomware. Removing shadow copies denies victims local recovery and signals imminent ransomware detonation.

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Malicious Shadow Copy Deletion via WMIC by DragonForce Ransomware (via process_creation)
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Malicious Volume Shadow Copy Deletion via WMI PowerShell
Pivot detection · T1490 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.