Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-17
Updated
2026-09-17

ATT&CK techniques

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects use of wevtutil to clear Windows event logs which the REF0657 actors performed against the System and Security logs to destroy evidence of their activity. Clearing event logs is a deliberate anti-forensic action that rarely has a legitimate operational reason.

Related detections9 linkedT1685.005 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Security Event Log Disabled via wevtutil
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil (via process_creation)
Suspicious Mass Windows Event Log Clearing via PowerShell (via ps_script)
Malicious Event Log Clear Attempt - Wmi (via process_creation)
Malicious Event Log Clear Attempt - Command (via process_creation)
Malicious Event Log Cleared Using Diagnostics - Via PowerShell (via powershell)
Malicious Clearing of Windows Event Logs (via process_creation)
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via wevtutil During Ransomware Activity
Suspicious Event Log Clearing via Get-WinEvent ClearLog (Qilin)
Malicious Windows Event Log Clearing via Wevtutil
Pivot detection · T1685.005 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.