Malicious Word Spawning Rundll32 Loading DLL from Roaming Word Folder

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-08-13
Updated
2026-08-28

ATT&CK techniques

Defense Evasion
  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects winword.exe launching rundll32.exe to load a DLL staged under the AppData Roaming Microsoft Word directory which is the Hancitor maldoc execution chain preceding Cuba ransomware. The malicious macro drops and side loads the loader from a user writable path. It is important because this parent child pattern reliably marks initial Hancitor infection.

Related detections9 linkedT1218.011 — drag to rearrange
Malicious Rundll32 Loading an Export From a User Path (via process_creation)
Renamed Regsvr32 or Rundll32 Loading a DLL With a Non-Standard Extension (via process_creation)
Malicious Rundll32 DllRegisterServer Execution From a User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
IMEEX Framework DLL Execution via Rundll32 Loading imaadp (via process_creation)
Suspicious Persistence via pcalua Launching rundll32 Control_RunDLL
Suspicious Rundll32 Executing DLL Start Export With Control Flags
Suspicious Rundll32 Execution of Timestamp-Named DLL
Suspicious Rundll32 Loading DLL from LocalAppData with Short Export (via process_creation)
Suspicious Rundll32 Loading DLL from User-Writable Path (via process_creation)
Malicious Word Spawning Rundll32 Loading DLL from Roaming Word Folder
Pivot detection · T1218.011 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.