huntrule

Malicious XRed Backdoor Execution from ProgramData Synaptics Path (via process_creation)

PremiumReviewedSigma · High · v1
Product
windows
Category
process_creation
Author
HuntRule
Published
2026-09-21
Updated
2026-09-21
AnalysisDetection

ATT&CK techniques

Persistence → Priv Esc

  1. Recon

  2. Resource Dev

  3. Initial Access

  4. Execution

  5. Persistence

  6. Priv Esc

  7. Defense Evasion

  8. Cred Access

  9. Discovery

  10. Lateral Movement

  11. Collection

  12. C2

  13. Exfiltration

  14. Impact

What it detects

This rule detects execution of Synaptics.exe from the ProgramData\Synaptics directory, the drop location used by the XRed backdoor bundled inside trojanized InstantView software. A genuine Synaptics touchpad driver never runs from ProgramData, so this path is a strong false-context indicator. The backdoor provides remote command execution, screen capture, keylogging and SMTP exfiltration.

Reporting behind it

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Malicious PlugX Persistence via LMIGuardian Update Run Key (via registry_set)
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Malicious XRed Backdoor Execution from ProgramData Synaptics Path (via process_creation)
Pivot detection · T1547.001 · 9 related

Detection content is published as a reviewed draft. Tune thresholds and exclusions against your own telemetry before enabling this rule for alerting.